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TRUST RECEIPTS - AUTOMOBILES - ESTOPPEL OF RECEIPTOR TO CLAIM
AGAMNST BONA FmEn PURcHAsER-[Federal].-Plaintiff held legal title to
an automobile by reason of a trust receipt executed by a local dealer. The
dealer displayed the automobile in his show room and sold it in the regular
course of business. The dealer took as a part of the purchase price the
purchaser's negotiable promissory note and a conditional sales contract.
The dealer transferred the note and contract to defendant, who took for
value without notice of plaintiff's claim. The purchaser defaulted and de-
fendant repossessed the car. Plaintiff sued to recover possession. Held, that
the plaintiff was estopped to deny title in the local dealer and could not
claim possession as against the defendant.1
The result is similar to that reached by the Supreme Court of California
in a recent case2 based on almost identical facts, except that it does not
appear that a negotiable instrument was there involved. The decisions in
the two cases are based on the recognized principle that the true owner
of a chattel, by allowing a dealer to have possession with knowledge that
it will be displayed, is precluded from asserting his claim against a bona
fide purchaser.8 Ordinarily where one is in possession of property subject
to a trust receipt, the receiptor's rights are not affected by a sale of the
goods to a bona fide purchaser.4 The instant cases present an interesting
extension of the doctrine of estoppel in favor of the assignees of conditional
1. General Credit, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co. (App. D. C. 1938) 99 F.
(2d) 115.
2. Commercial Credit Co. v. Barney Motor Co. (Cal. 1938) 76 P. (2d)
1181. Accord, Tharp v. San Joaquin Valley Securities Co. (1937) 20 Cal.
App. (2d) 20, 66 P. (2d) 230. In California Standard Finance Corp. v.
Riverside Finance Co. (1931) 111 Cal. App. 151, 295 Pac. 555, defendant
was assignee of two conditional sales contracts from a dealer on cars covered
by trust receipts. One had been given by a bona fide purchaser without
notice, the other by one who knew of the trust receipts. The court held
that as to the contract from the bona fide purchaser, receiptor was estopped
as against the defendant, but as to the one not from a bona fide purchaser,
receiptor was not so estopped. Contra, Henderson v. General Acceptance
Corp. (1930) 209 Cal. 268, 286 Pac. 1014; Essex County Acceptance Corp.
v. Pierce Arrow Sales Co. (1934) 288 Mass. 270, 192 N. E. 604, 95 A. L. R.
1314; see also Iowa Guaranty Mortgage Corp. v. General Motors Accep-
tance Corp. (1933) 62 S. D. 18, 250 N. W. 669. This conflict in decisions
is probably due to the variety of circumstances out of which the cases arise
and difference among the courts as to the relationship created by trust re-
ceipts. In this connection see 7 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
(1935) 342, sec. 4755; Note (1935) 101 A. L. R. 453; 2A Bogert, Uniformn
Laws, Annotated (1924) 17, sec. 12.
3. Singletary v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (C. C. A. 5, 1934)
'73 F. (2d) 543; Globe Securities Co. v. Gardner Motor Co. (1935) 337
Mo. 177, 85 S. W. (2d) 561. 1 U. L. A. (1931) 189, sec. 23 provides in part:
"Where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who
does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner,
the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless
the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's
authority to sell."
4. Void, Sales (1931) 355, sec. 113 says: "Each can transfer only what
he has, and the creditor of each can take only what he has. Caveat emptor.
Caveat creditor."
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sales contracts. The courts have been unwilling to accord similar protection
to persons taking mortgages on automobiles to secure loans to dealers. 5
The reason for this refusal is that mortgagees are not considered to be in
the same position as purchasers. 6 A purchaser of chattels from a dealer
cannot be expected to verify the title of the dealer; such a requirement
would be a serious hindrance to trade.7 On the other hand, mortgagees
ordinarily are bankers or companies with superior facilities for the inves-
tigation of automobile titles." It would seem that the objections voiced
against extension of the principle of protection to mortgagees would apply
with equal force to assignees of conditional sales contracts.9 The principle
itself, being an exception to the more general common law rule that mere
possession delivered to another will not be sufficient grounds for an estoppel,
should be strictly construed.lo It is submitted that the assignee of a simple
conditional sales contract should get no greater right than his assignor
had." In the instant case however there was an additional consideration.
The assignment involved a negotiable instrument. The policy favoring cir-
culability of negotiable instruments therefore may justify the extension of
the estoppel principle in this case. W. J. H.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-RECONDITIONING USED GOODS-PERMIssIBLE LIMITS
OF RESALE OF PATENTED OR TRADEMARKED ARTiCLEs-[Federal].-Defendant
cleaned, readjusted, and sold used spark plugs as "reconditioned" under their
original name and trade-mark. The manufacturer of the original spark
plugs asked that this action of the defendant be enjoined. Held, prelimi-
nary injunction granted. While defendant had a right to repair and sell,
he could not market the product as "reconditioned" and as that of plain-
tiff.1
5. People's Loan & Investment Co. v. Universal Credit Co. (C. C. A. 8,
1935) 75 F. (2d) 545; Singletary v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (C.
C. A. 5, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 543; National Guaranty & Finance Co. v. Pfaff
Motor Co. (1931) 124 Ohio St. 34, 176 N. E. 678.
6. Rasmussen v. Lee & Co., Inc. (1937) 104 Mont. 278, 66 P. (2d) 119;
National Guaranty & Finance Co. v. Pfaff Motor Co. (1931) 124 Ohio St.
34, 176 N. E. 678. Contra, Bauer v. Commercial Credit Co. (1931) 163
Wash. 210, 300 Pac. 1049.
7. Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp. (1920) 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E.
591, 10 A. L. R. 654; Comment (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 574.
8. Pacific Finance Corp. v. Hendley (1932) 119 Cal. App. 679, 7 P. (2d)
391; Globe Securities Co. v. Gardner Motor Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 177, 85
S. W. (2d) 561; Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp. (1920) 127 Va. 563,
102 S. E. 591, 10 A. L. R. 654; Comment (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 375;
Note (1932) 87 A. L. R. 302.
9. Forgan v. Gordon Motor Finance Co. (1932) 350 Ill. 445, 183 N. E.
462; Sunbury Finance Co. v. Boyd Motor Co. (1935) 119 Pa. Super. 412,
180 At]. 103.
10. Pacific Finance Corp. v. Hendley (1932) 119 Cal. App. 679, 7 P.(2d) 391; Forgan v. Gordon Motor Finance Co. (1932) 350 I1. 445, 183
N. E. 462.
11. C. 1. T. Corp. v. American National Bank (1930) 256 Ill. App. 38;
Perkins v. Lippincott Co. (1918) 260 Pa. 473, 103 Atl. 877.
1. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Reich (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1938) 24 F.
Supp. 945.
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